Cooperation between Referees and Authors Increases Peer Review Accuracy by Leek, Jeffrey T. et al.
Cooperation between Referees and Authors Increases
Peer Review Accuracy
Jeffrey T. Leek
1*, Margaret A. Taub
1, Fernando J. Pineda
1,2
1Department of Biostatistics, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America, 2Department of Molecular Microbiology
and Immunology, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America
Abstract
Peer review is fundamentally a cooperative process between scientists in a community who agree to review each other’s
work in an unbiased fashion. Peer review is the foundation for decisions concerning publication in journals, awarding of
grants, and academic promotion. Here we perform a laboratory study of open and closed peer review based on an online
game. We show that when reviewer behavior was made public under open review, reviewers were rewarded for refereeing
and formed significantly more cooperative interactions (13% increase in cooperation, P=0.018). We also show that referees
and authors who participated in cooperative interactions had an 11% higher reviewing accuracy rate (P=0.016). Our results
suggest that increasing cooperation in the peer review process can lead to a decreased risk of reviewing errors.
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Introduction
Peer review is the foundation for decisions concerning
publication in journals, awarding of grants, and academic
promotion. Anonymous peer review plays a major role in decisions
concerning publication in journals, awarding of grants and
academic promotion. However, the anonymous nature of peer
review is increasingly under scrutiny [1–4], and some journals
have considered or already moved to open peer review [3,5–7].
Debates about the utility and ethics of anonymity, have led to
questions concerning whether there is any science behind peer
review [8], to calls for an evidenced-based rationale for peer
review [9], and to debates about alternative practices of peer
review [2–4].
Despite its central role in the scientific process, the underlying
social dynamics and accuracy of peer review under alternative
systems are difficult to study. It is perhaps not surprising that there
are few reliable studies of peer review. Conclusive randomized
controlled studies require cooperation and coordination of
journals, editors and authors within an academic community. It
has been argued that many studies are inconclusive or suffer from
methodological defects, primarily due to the robustness of author
or review blinding [10]. Moreover, these studies focus on review
quality [11–16], rather than correctness or impact of the results
which can only be assessed retrospectively and after scientific
consensus is achieved.
Here we develop a theoretical model for peer-review which can
be described in terms of payoffs for author and referee behavior.
We analyze the theoretical model to determine the properties of
optimal strategies under both open and closed peer review. We
then develop a model system in the form of an online game
launched from the Amazon EC2 cloud to collect data to both
support our theoretical model and evaluate accuracy and social
dynamics under peer review. Using our model system, we perform
experiments to collect quantitative data about the social behavior
of referees in anonymous (closed) and non-anonymous (open) peer
review. These data represent the first direct quantitative
measurements of peer review accuracy under alternative peer
reviewing systems. Using these data we show that: (1) under open
review peer reviewers are rewarded for refereeing in contrast to
closed review, (2) reviewers and authors are significantly more
likely to cooperate under open review versus closed review, and (3)
cooperative peer reviewing behavior leads to higher review
accuracy.
Results
Theoretical Model
Definition of the Peer Review Game. In our model there
are K players participating in a game for a total of T units of time.
Each player in the game participates in two activities: (1) solving
problems and (2) reviewing solutions of their peers. For player k,
the total time spent reviewing Tr
k and solving Ts
k must be less than
the total time allocated for playing the game Tr
kzTs
kƒT. Over
the course of the game, player k submits Ns
k solutions and reviews
Nr
k solutions for other players. Let sikj indicate the ith solution for
player k, which is reviewed by player j. For each solution there is a
corresponding time the solution was submitted ts
ikj and time that
the reviewer completed the review tr
ikj. For player k the number of
accepted papers at time t is the sum of the indicators that each of
their submitted solutions is accepted up to that point:
Ak(t)~
X
fi:tr
ijkvtg 1(sikj accepted).
The payoff is proportional to the number of accepted solutions,
which reflects the commonly held belief of ‘‘publish or perish’’ in
academia. So the expected payoff for player k at time t is:
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where pikj is the probability that solution i for player k is accepted
by player j. The payoff is a function of the number of submitted
solutions and the probability that each solution is accepted. The
probability a solution is accepted is a function of the submitter, the
reviewer, the time the solution is reviewed, and the solution itself.
pikj~f(sikj,tr
ikj,j,k)
where f(:) is a non-negative function mapping the solution, the
review time, the solver, and the reviewer onto ½0,1 . Player k can
increase their payoff by increasing the number of solutions they
submit or increasing the probability each solution is accepted.
An alternative is a competitive payoff where the payoff function
is proportional to the difference between a player’s number of
accepted solutions and the maximum of all the other player’s
payoffs. In this case, the expected payoff is:
E½Ak(t) {E½max
k
fAk(t)g ~E
X
fi:tr
ijkvtg
1(sikj accepted)
2
6 4
3
7 5
~
X
fi:tr
ijkvtg
pikj{E½max
k
fAk(t)g 
Closed Peer Review (CPR). Under closed peer review, the
model for the acceptance probability for solution sikj is modeled as:
f {1(pikj)~a(sikj)zb(k)zc(j)zk(A(tr
ikj))
Here there is an effect for the solution itself a(:) which may reflect
a large number of factors about the solution, including the type of
problem or the time spent on the solution. There is also an effect
for the solver b(:) since some solvers are more likely to submit
correct solutions than others. Each reviewer may choose to accept
or reject problems at a different rate which we model by c(:).
Under CPR the public information is the number of solutions that
each player has submitted and had accepted by another player.
A(tr
ikj)) is a vector of the cumulative number of accepted solutions
for each player at time tr
ijk. The function k(:) quantifies the
influence of this information on the probability solution sikj is
accepted.
At any given time point a player can choose between three
different strategies: (1) solve and submit a problem, (2) review a
problem and reject, or (3) review a problem and accept. The first
strategy has the potential to improve a player’s payoff, by
increasing the number of submitted solutions. If a player chooses
either of the first two strategies, no other player’s score will
increase. If the player chooses strategy (3), then another player’s
score will increase. However, that person will not know who
accepted their solution. Under CPR, if a player chooses strategy
(2) or (3) they will reduce the amount of time they spend solving a
problem and will reduce their expected payoff. However, no other
player will be aware of this choice since reviews are anonymous
and only the cumulative accepted solutions for each player is
known. In this game, there is no increase to the payoff function for
reviewing. Therefore, each player maximizes their expected payoff
by always choosing strategy (1) and never reviewing, so this
solution is the Nash equilibrium [17].
Open Peer Review (OPR). Under OPR the model for the
acceptance probability for solution sikj includes the same terms as
CPR, along with terms that encode the influence of the current
public and private information available to each player.
f {1(pikj)~a(sikj)zb(k)zc(j)zk(A(tr
ikj))zg(Ra(tr
ikj))
zj(Rkj(tr
ikj),Ra
kj(tr
ikj))
The model includes a term, g(), that is a function of vector of the
cumulative number of solutions reviewed and accepted by each
player. The functions k(:) and g(:) encode the public information
available to each player. Under the open system, player k also
knows the cumulative number of times player j has reviewed their
solutions, Rkj(tr
ikj), and accepted their solutions Ra
kj(tr
ikj) at the
time of the review. The function j quantifies the effect of this
information on the probability of acceptance.
Under the OPR it is possible that a player may incur some
benefit by reviewing for other players. Specifically if a player has
previously accepted solutions for player j, they may improve the
probability their solution is accepted through the function j(:).
Similarly, if they are a generous reviewer to all the other players,
player j may again be more sympathetic and the probability of
acceptance may be increased through the function g(:). The
residual benefit of reviewing may carry over to future times, so the
functions g and j are functions of the cumulative reviews and
acceptances to time point tr
ijk.
Under OPR, a player still has the same three strategy choices at
any given time point: (1) solve and submit a problem, (2) review a
problem and reject, or (3) review a problem and accept. However,
under OPR a player may incur some increase in their probability
of acceptance if they choose strategy (2) or (3). They are
particularly likely to incur increases in their acceptance probability
when choosing strategy (3). Under this mode, additional Nash
equilibria may be possible. To calculate these equilibria,
substantial additional assumptions are required about the benefit
of reviewing, the time it costs to perform a review, and the timing
of additional reviews. Since the payoffs functions now depend
continuously on the number of accepted and reviewed at each
time point, the game must be modeled as a continuous game.
Theoretical analysis of OPR represents a potentially fruitful area
for future research.
Relative Payoff of Reviewing and Solving. It is not difficult
to argue that in science, the payoff for solving problems is
significantly greater than the payoff of reviewing submissions. The
only way to change this ordering is to decrease the payoff for
solving problems or to increase the payoff for reviewing problems,
or both. The former might be achieved in situations where the
information available to the community causes the community to
punish a player by reducing the acceptance rate of the player’s
submissions [13]. The latter might be achieved by increasing the
time spent reviewing and rejecting the submissions of other
players. An example would be if a player could somehow reject all
the submissions of a strong competitor, without knowledge of these
actions being provided to the community.
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Setup. Our model system for peer review was an online game
launched from the Amazon EC2 cloud played by 7–10 individuals
over a fixed period. Players were graduate students, postdoctoral
fellows, research scientists or principal investigators, all of whom
are members of a single research laboratory. The game was
designed to replicate several components of editorial peer review:
(1) most reviewers know the authors of the papers they referee, (2)
peer review is usually performed within relatively small
communities of individuals [18], and (3) peer review involves
repeated interactions between referees and authors. The game’s
interface presented players with multiple-choice questions similar
to those found on the Graduate Record Exam (GRE) [19]. At any
point in the game a player chose between solving problems or
reviewing (accepting or rejecting) solutions submitted by other
players. The software also played the role of journal editor and
randomly assigned submitted solutions to players for review. At the
end of the game, the two players with the largest number of
accepted submissions received monetary rewards, reflecting the
conventional publish or perish academic incentives.
Individual games were played in either a closed mode, or in an
open mode. In the closed mode, the reviewers were anonymous
(Figure 1 left column). In the open mode, players knew which
reviewer accepted or rejected each of their submissions (Figure 1
right column). The public information under the closed mode was
the number of submitted solutions that were accepted. In the open
mode, both the number of submitted solutions that were accepted
and the number of times each player accepted a peers solution
were public.
Experimental results agree with theoretical model and
previous studies of peer review. To mimic the dynamics of a
small community of scientists, we recruited individual research
laboratories to play the Peer Review Game (Materials and
Methods). We recruited members of six research laboratories at
Johns Hopkins University to play the Peer Review Game in closed
mode (3 labs, n=8, 8, and 9 players) and open mode (3 labs,
n=7,10, and 8 players). Each laboratory played the game for
T=40 minutes. We collected a total of 1,143 solutions and 666
reviews over the course of the six experiments. Overall, 62% of the
submitted solutions were correct. Peer review did lead to an
increase in accuracy; only 39% of rejected solutions were correct,
while 78% of accepted solutions were correct. We first evaluated
our experimental model by comparing our results to predictions of
our theoretical model, previous results on iterated games, and
previous studies of peer review.
In the open system each solution a player accepted led to an
increased probability their own next submission would be accepted
(2% increase per accepted solution, P=0.047). Our theoretical
analysis suggested a similar potential increase in probability for
helpful reviewing behavior. Under closed review players were not
rewarded for reviewing additional submissions, i.e. there was no
significant difference in the probability a playerO ˜ s submissions
would be accepted for each additional review (0.8% decrease per
accepted solution, P=0.30).
Figure 1. Open versus closed peer review systems for the peer review game. Under the closed system of peer review (left column),
reviewers know the identity of problem solvers, but problem solvers do not know the identity of the reviewers. Public information is limited to the
number of accepted solutions for each player. Under the open system of peer review (right column) solvers and reviewers are known to each other,
and both the number of accepted solutions and accepted reviews for each player are known publicly.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026895.g001
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one of the winners of the game, suggesting that reviewers were
rewarded for their good behavior toward other players (Materials
and Methods). This result agrees with both our theoretical analysis
and the results of previous studies of iterated games, which showed
that costly punishment has been shown to be negatively associated
with payoff. In other words ‘‘winners don’t punish’’ [20].
Review times were not significantly different between open and
closed review (2 seconds longer on average for closed games,
P=0.31), consistent with observations from randomized con-
trolled trials [12]. However, in the closed games players spent a
higher proportion of their time solving problems instead of
reviewing (Figure 2 top row), while in the open games, there was a
greater balance between reviewing and submission (Figure 2
bottom row). In two of the closed experiments, individuals spent
nearly all of their time solving problems; this behavior was only
observed once in the open experiments.
Finally, overall reviewing accuracy was statistically indistin-
guishable between open and closed peer review (1% more
accuracy under closed, P=0.762). This result agrees with previous
studies of open and closed peer review which showed no
statistically significant difference in review quality between the
two systems [14].
Open review leads to increased cooperation which leads
to increased review accuracy. An important question is
whether making reviewing behavior public facilitates
cooperation. For each experiment we calculated a pair-wise
measure of cooperation between players (Materials and Methods).
The open review experiments showed more cooperative
connections than the closed experiments (22% versus 9%
respectively, P=0.018, Figure 3). It was not immediately clear
that cooperation between referees and authors would increase
reviewing accuracy. Intuitively, one might expect that players who
cooperate would always accept each others solutions - regardless of
whether they were correct. However, we observed that when a
submitter and reviewer acted cooperatively, reviewing accuracy
actually increased by 11% (P=0.016). The difference in accuracy
was significant even after adjusting for the fact that some solvers
had higher accuracy than others (11% increase in accuracy,
P=0.039). The increase in reviewing accuracy was mediated by
cooperative interactions between players, since overall accuracy
was comparable under open and closed peer review (1% more
accuracy under closed, P=0.762).
Discussion
We have developed both a theoretical and experimental model
for peer review. Our theoretical model allows exploration of the
relative impact of alternative systems and incentives for peer
review. A basic analysis of the theoretical model suggests that the
Figure 2. Open peer reviewers spend a greater proportion of their time reviewing. Each panel is a plot of the cumulative proportion of
time each individual spends solving problems during the experiment over the course of the game. Under closed peer review, individuals spend a
greater proportion of their time solving (top row). In two experiments (Closed Experiment 1, Closed Experiment 2), an individual spent almost 100%
of their time solving problems. Under open peer review, individuals spent a smaller proportion of their time solving problems and a greater
proportion of their time reviewing problems (bottom row).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026895.g002
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activities. Further exploration of the model under alternative
systems and incentives may be helpful in evaluating alternative
models of review going forward. Using our experimental model,
we were able to collect the first data on social interactions and
accuracy under alternative peer review models. Our experimental
results both substantiate our theoretical model and agree with
previous studies of peer review systems. We have also shown that
one mechanism for increased cooperation is making reviewer
information public. But other mechanisms for improving cooper-
ation in the review process may exist; for example, reducing calls
for unnecessary experiments has recently been suggested as a
potential improvement in the reviewing process [21]. Our results
indicate that improved cooperation does in fact lead to improved
reviewing accuracy. These results suggest that in this era of
increasing competition for publication and grants, cooperation is
vital for accurate evaluation of scientific research.
Materials and Methods
The Peer Review Game
We developed a peer review game that can be played by two or
more players. The game was developed as an Amazon Machine
Image (AMI) that can be launched from the Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud [22]. The game was developed using the vWorker
online development platform [23]. Players were directed to a
website of a temporary web-server and logged on with a user name
and password. When the investigator initiated the game, the
players were shown a task selection page (Figure 4). They could
choose to solve a problem or choose to review a problem from
their list of pending reviews. If a player chose to solve a problem,
then a GRE-like problem was selected from a database for them to
solve and displayed to their screen (Figure 5). The GRE problems
used for the experiment were based on problems from the website
[19]. If they chose to review a problem, then they were shown a
solution to a problem submitted by one of their peers (Figure 6).
They could choose to either accept or reject the solution to the
problem. The program acted as editor, randomly assigning
problems to players for peer review.
In both the open and closed games reviewers were shown the
identity of the player who solved the problem. Under the open
system, solvers were also shown the identity of the player who
acted as peer reviewer for their solution. Throughout the game,
information was projected onto a screen at the front of the room.
In the closed mode, the number of solutions each player had
submitted and had accepted was displayed (Figure 7a). In the open
mode, the number of solutions each player had reviewed and
accepted for one of their peers was also displayed (Figure 7b).
At the beginning of each game, the players were read the
instructions for the appropriate mode (closed or open) as described
in the following sections. The investigator then initiated a session
of the Peer Review Game that lasted for T=40 minutes in each
case. Nametags were given to each subject with their anonymous
subject ID at the beginning of the experiment and players were
permitted to speak to one another during the course of the
experiment.
Recruitment
Six laboratories at the Johns Hopkins Medical School and Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health were recruited to
participate in the peer review experiment. Laboratories consisted
of graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, research scientists, and
Figure 3. Open reviewers are more cooperative than closed reviewers. Each panel shows the cooperation network for one of the peer
review experiments. The thickness of the line indicates the amount of interaction and color indicates the type of interaction. Cooperation (blue) is
defined as above average probability of both players accepting each others solutions. Obstruction (red) is defined as below average probability of
both players accepting each others solutions. Under closed review (top row) there is less cooperation between players than under open review
(bottom row).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026895.g003
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replication of the Peer Review Game; the goal was to mimic the
small and relatively tight-knit communities of scientists who act as
peer reviewers for each other’s papers. Experiments were
performed on laboratories of laboratories of size K=8, 8, and 9
players for the closed game and K=7,10, and 8 players for the
Figure 4. The task selection screens for the Peer Review Game. Task selection under the (a) closed and (b) open modes. In each case a player
may elect to solve or review a problem. In the open peer review mode, players know the identity of the players reviewing their solutions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026895.g004
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 November 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | e26895Figure 5. The problem solving screen for the Peer Review Game. The problem solving screen is the same for both versions of the game.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026895.g005
Figure 6. The reviewing screen for the Peer Review Game. The reviewing screen is the same for both versions of the game.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026895.g006
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 November 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | e26895Figure 7. The public information screens for the Peer Review Game. Public information under the (a) closed and (b) open modes. In each
case the number of solutions each player has had accepted are displayed. In the open review system, the number of solutions reviewed and accepted
by each player is also displayed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026895.g007
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 November 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | e26895open game. Participating laboratories were offered $50 for each 10
participating members of the lab, a complimentary lunch, and the
potential for two lab members to earn $5 each. Written informed
consent was obtained from all participants in the study.
Recruitment was performed with approval from the Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health IRB, project number
3316.
Group dynamics measurement
Next we estimated a measure of cooperation or obstruction
between subjects i and j. The baseline observed acceptance
probability for subject i, Pi was calculated as Ai=Ni where Ai is the
number of solutions accepted by subject i and Ni is the number of
solutions reviewed by subject i. We computed the observed
probability that subject i accepts a solution submitted by subject j,
Pij,a sAij=Nij, where Aij is the number of solutions accepted by
subject i which were submitted by subject j, and Nij is the number
of solutions reviewed by subject i which were submitted by subject
j. The difference dij~Pij{Pi gives a measure of the change in the
probability subject i accepts a solution from subject j relative to
their overall acceptance rate. Similarly, we can calculate dji as a
symmetric measurement. If dij and dji are both positive, then the
interaction between the two subjects is cooperative. Similarly, if
both values are negative, the interaction between the two subjects
is obstructive. We calculated the total number of possible
interactions under both the open and closed peer review
experiments. Among these, we identified the number that were
cooperative. We then performed a two-sample test of proportions
to evaluate whether there was more cooperation under OPR or
CPR.
Outcome modeling
In all outcome modeling, the unit of observation is one reviewed
problem. Each reviewed problem has a solver and a reviewer and
is associated with a particular study type, either open or closed.
To control for differences in behavior between individual
participants, the models described below were fit using a mixed-
model framework, with all models including separate random
effects for solvers and reviewers. Model fitting was done in the
statistical programming language R [24] using the function glmer
from the package lme4 with a linear link assuming Gaussian
distribution of random effects [25]. In a general form the random
effects model can be written as
yijt~mz
X p
k~1
bkxijtkzuizvjzeijt
where yijt is the outcome of interest related to a review at time t by
subject j, for a solution submitted by subject i; m is the mean
outcome over the whole data set; xijtk is the kth covariate of
interest which has effect size bk, ui is a random effect associated
with subject i and vj is a random effect associated with subject j.
We assume that ui, vj and eijt are mean zero Normal random
variables with variances s2
u,s2
v and s2
e, respectively.
To assess the impact of previous review performance by a
subject on the chance that solutions submitted by that subject will
be accepted, we associated to each reviewed problem the number
of solutions accepted by the problem submitter, up to the time the
problem was reviewed. In the open framework, this value was
known to all study participants, including the reviewer; in the
closed framework, this value was unknown.
Modeling the acceptance probability of a submission as a
function of this covariate and the study type, and their interaction,
we assessed the change in acceptance probability for each solution
accepted by the submitter, in either the open or closed review
setting. Define aijt to be the indicator that solution sijt is accepted.
The model is then:
aijt~mzb1Ra
itzb2Sijzb3Ra
itSijzuizvjzeijt
where Ra
it is the number of reviewed and accepted solutions by
subject i by time t, Sij is an indicator of the study type that subjects
i and j participated in (taking a value of 0 for closed review and 1
for open review). In this model ui is a random effect representing
the solver, vj is a random effect representing the reviewer and eijt
represents residual variation not due to reviewer or solver effects.
To assess the impact of the open or closed scenarios on review
quality, we associated to each reviewed problem an indicator of
whether the review was accurate, given that we know the
correctness of the submitted solution.
We defined the variable cijt to be an indicator of whether
solution sijt was correctly reviewed (e.g. accepted if correct,
rejected if incorrect). To assess the impact of cooperation on
review accuracy, for each reviewed problem, we defined a 0–1
indicator Oijt which takes a values of 1 if subjects i and j have a
cooperative interaction. We then fit the model
cijt~mzb1Oijtzuizvjzeijt
where all terms are as defined above.
To ensure the effect observed in this model is not due only to
the increased accuracy of the solution submitted by the problem
solver, for each reviewed problem we defined a three-level factor,
with level 0 indicating that neither the solver nor the reviewer was
part of a cooperative pair, 1 indicating that only the solver was
part of a cooperative pair, and 2 indicating that both the solver
and the reviewer are part of a cooperative pair. Calling this
variable Qijt we then fit the model
cijt~mzb1Qijtzuizvjzeijt
where all terms are as defined above.
We also modeled this accuracy as a function of study type alone
to determine whether one scenario produced more accurate
reviews. We fit the model
cijt~mzb1Sijzuizvjzeijt
where all terms are as defined above.
Instructions for the Closed Peer Review Games
Purpose of research project. This research is being done to
evaluate open and closed peer review systems experimentally. Peer
review is the process by which scientific research is evaluated for
publication in journals. The goal of this study is to determine
whether anonymous (closed) or non-anonymous (open) peer
review results in more correct research being accepted.
Why you are being asked to participate. You are being
asked to participate in the study because you are a graduate
student, postdoctoral research fellow, scientist, or faculty member
at Johns Hopkins University and are representative of the
population of individuals who will participate in the peer review
process.
Procedures. Once the experiment begins, you will be asked
to answer multiple choice questions similar to questions on the
graduate record exam (GRE). After you submit your answer, the
Cooperation Increases Review Accuracy
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study for review. The reviewer can either choose to accept or
reject the solution. The reviewer will know your subject ID.
However subjects who submit solutions will not know the ID of the
reviewer of their solution. Throughout the course of the
experiment you will act as both a reviewer and a problem
solver. You may spend as much time as you like on either task.
The experiment will last for forty minutes. I will now show you
example screens from the experiment website and you may ask
questions about the study procedure.
Risks/discomforts. You may experience some stress since
you will be asked to answer GRE like problems and review the
solutions of your peers. However, the only interaction you will
have with other participants will be through the anonymous
subject IDs.
Payment. The two individuals with the most accepted
answers at the conclusion of the experiment will receive $5. The
payment will be in cash immediately following the experiment. If
you leave the study early you will lose your opportunity to win the
cash prizes distributed at the end of the experiment.
Protecting data confidentiality. All research projects carry
some risk that information about you may become known to
people outside of a study. We minimize these risks by not
connecting your responses to any information that could be used
to identify you. All data collected during this experiment will only
be connected with the anonymous subject ID you have been
assigned.
Protecting subject privacy during data collection. Your
responses and reviews will not be personally associated with you.
All interaction will be performed based on the anonymous subject
IDs you have been assigned.
What happens if you leave the study early? You may leave
the study at any time without penalty.
Instructions for the Open Peer Review Games
Purpose of research project. This research is being done to
test open and closed peer review systems experimentally. Peer
review is the process by which scientific research is evaluated for
publication in journals. The goal of this study is to determine
whether anonymous (closed) or non-anonymous (open) peer
review results in more correct research being accepted.
Why you are being asked to participate. You are being
asked to participate in the study because you are a graduate
student, postdoctoral research fellow, scientist, or faculty member
at Johns Hopkins University and are representative of the
population of individuals who will participate in the peer review
process.
Procedures. Once the experiment begins, you will be asked
to answer multiple choice questions similar to questions on the
graduate record exam (GRE). After you submit your answer, the
solution will be randomly assigned to another participant in the
study for review. The reviewer can either choose to accept or
reject the solution. The reviewer will know your subject ID and
you will know the reviewer ID for each solution after it is reviewed.
Throughout the course of the experiment you will act as both a
reviewer and a problem solver. You may spend as much time as
you like on either task. The experiment will last for one forty
minutes. I will now show you example screens from the
experiment website and you may ask questions about the study
procedure.
Risks/discomforts. You may experience some stress since
you will be asked to answer GRE like problems and review the
solutions of your peers. However, the only interaction you will
have with other participants will be through the anonymous
subject IDs.
Payment. The two individuals with the most accepted
answers at the conclusion of the experiment will receive $5. The
payment will be in cash immediately following the experiment. If
you leave the study early you will lose your opportunity to win the
cash prizes distributed at the end of the experiment.
Protecting data confidentiality. All research projects carry
some risk that information about you may become known to
people outside of a study. We minimize these risks by not
connecting your responses to any information that could be used
to identify you. All data collected during this experiment will only
be connected with the anonymous subject ID you have been
assigned.
Protecting subject privacy during data collection. Your
responses and reviews will not be personally associated with you.
All interaction will be performed based on the anonymous subject
IDs you have been assigned.
What happens if you leave the study early? You may leave
the study at any time without penalty.
Reproducible Research
To conform with the standards of reproducible research, R [24]
scripts and R data objects have been posted at: http://www.
biostat.jhsph.edu/,jleek/peerreview/ that reproduce all analyses
performed in this paper.
Informed Consent
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants in
this study. This specific study was approved by the Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health IRB with project number
3316.
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